We investigate situations in which agents can only communicate to each other through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of outcomes that can be induced in pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a subset of the equilibrium outcomes that can be induced in direct communication, characterized by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Moreover, the set of supportable outcomes in pure equilibria is monotonic in each intermediator's bias, and the intermediator with the largest bias serves as a bottleneck for the information flow. On the other hand, there can be mixed strategy equilibria of intermediated communication that ex ante Pareto-dominate all equilibria in direct communication, as mixing by an intermediator can relax the incentive compatibility constraints on the sender. We provide a partial characterization of mixed strategy equilibria, and show that the order of intermediators matters with respect to mixed equilibria, as opposed to pure strategy ones.
Introduction
In many settings, physical, social, or institutional constraints prevent people from communicating directly. In the US army, companies report to battalions, which in turn report to brigades (companies are not allowed to report directly to brigades). Similarly, in many organizations, there is a rigid hierarchical structure for communication flow within the organization. Even without explicit regulations, there are time and resource constraints preventing all communication to be direct. The managing director of a large company cannot give instructions to all workers of the company directly. Instead, she typically only talks directly to high level managers, who further communicate with lower level managers, who in turn talk to the workers. Finally, in traditional societies, the social network and various conventions might prevent direct communication between two members of the society. For example, a man might not be allowed to talk directly to a non-relative woman; instead, he has to approach the woman's parents or husband, and ask them to transfer a piece of information.
There is a line of literature in organizational economics, starting with Sah and Stiglitz (1986) and Radner (1992) , investigating information transmission within organizations.
1 However, all the papers in this literature assume homogeneity of preferences and hence abstract away from strategic issues in communication. As opposed to this, in this paper we analyze information transmission through agents who are strategic and interested in influencing the outcome of the communication.
To achieve this, we extend the classic model of Crawford and Sobel (1982 ; from now on CS), to investigate intermediated communication. 2 We investigate communication along a given chain: player 1 privately observes the realization of a continuous random variable and sends a message to player 1 Radner (1992) , Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) , and van Zandt (1999) examine organizations in which different pieces of information have to get to the same member, but any member can potentially process a task once having all pieces of information. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) and Visser (2000) study the contrast between the performance of hierarchic and polyarchic organizations in a related setting. Garricano (2000) and Arenas et al. (2008) consider networks in which individuals specialize to solve certain tasks, and it takes a search procedure (through communication among agents) to find the right individual for the right problem. Cremer et al. (2007) studies nonstrategic communication in different hierarchical structures. Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) consider strategic communication between a head quarter and organizational divisions, but the communication is direct (not intermediated) between participants. Outside the organizational economics framework, Acemoglu et al. (2009) , and Golub and Jackson (2009) examine nonstrategic communication in social networks.
2 For a more general class of sender-receiver games than the CS framework, see Green and Stokey (2007). 2, who then sends a message to player 3, and so on, until communication reaches player n. We refer to player 1 as the sender, player n as the receiver, and players 2, .., n − 1 as the intermediators. The receiver, after receiving a message from the last intermediator, chooses an action on the real line, which affects the well-being of all players. We assume that all intermediators are strategic, and have preferences from the same class of preferences that CS consider for senders.
First, we consider pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (PBNE) of such indirect communication games, and show that any outcome that can be induced in such equilibria can also be induced in the direct communication game between the sender and the receiver (the equilibria of which are characterized in CS). This is a general result that applies to general communication networks and protocols, not only the hierarchical communication protocol along a chain that we focus on in the paper. Hence, if one restricts attention to pure strategy equilibria, intermediators can only filter out information, as opposed to facilitating more efficient information transmission. We present a simple condition for checking if a given equilibrium outcome of the direct communication game can be achieved with a certain chain of intermediators. This condition reveals that the order of intermediators does not matter in pure strategy PBNE, that is, even if the order of intermediators is changed, the set of pure PBNE does not change. We also show that the set of pure strategy PBNE outcomes is monotonic in each of the intermediators' biases: increasing an intermediator's bias (in absolute value) weakly decreases the set of PBNE outcomes. In the standard context of state-independent biases and symmetric loss functions, only the intermediator with the largest bias (in absolute terms) matters: this intermediator becomes a bottleneck in information transmission.
More surprisingly, we show that when allowing for mixed strategies, there can be equilibria of the indirect communication game that can strictly improve communication (resulting in higher ex ante expected payoff for both the sender and the receiver) relative to all equilibria of the game with direct communication. This has implications for organizational design, as the result shows that hierarchical communication protocols can increase information transmission in the organization, if communication is strategic.
At the core of this result is the observation first made by Myerson (1991, p285-288) , that noise can improve communication in sender-receiver games.
Myerson provides an example with two states of the world in which there is no informative equilibrium with noiseless communication. However, when player 1 has access to a messenger pigeon that only reaches its target with probability 1/2, then there is an equilibrium of the game with communication in which the sender sends the pigeon in one state but not the other one, and the receiver takes different actions depending on whether the pigeon arrives or not. Obviously, the same equilibrium can be induced with a strategic intermediator (instead of a noisy communication device) if conditional on the first state, the intermediator happens to be exactly indifferent between inducing either of the two equilibrium actions. What we show in the context of the CS model is that such indifferences, which are necessary to induce strategic intermediators to randomize, can be created endogenously in equilibrium, for an open set of environments. The intuition why such induced mixing can improve information revelation by the sender is similar to the one in Myerson (1991) and in Blume et al. (2007) : the induced noise can relax the incentive compatibility constraints on the sender, by making certain messages (low messages for a positively biased sender, high messages for a negatively biased sender) relatively more attractive.
As a motivation for studying such mixed equilibria, we think that the idea of purification (Harsányi (1973) ) is particularly appealing in communication games. In particular, one can view mixed equilibria in indirect communication games in which all players have a fixed known bias function as limits of pure strategy equilibria of communication games in which players' ex post preferences have a small random component. This assumption makes the model more realistic, as it is typically a strong assumption that the bias of each player is perfectly known by others. 3 We provide a characterization of all mixed strategy equilibria of indirect communication games. In particular, we show that there is a positive lower bound on how close two actions induced in a PBNE can be to each other, which depends on the last intermediator's bias. This implies that there is a finite upper bound on the number of actions induced in a PBNE. Furthermore, we show that all PBNE are outcome-equivalent to an equilibrium in which: (i) the state space is partitioned into a finite number of subintervals such that in the interior of any interval, the sender sends a pure message; (ii) after any history the sender and the intermediators mix at most between two messages; (iii) the receiver plays a pure action after any message; and (iv) for each player except the receiver, the distribution of actions induced by different equilibrium messages can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. We establish additional results for the case of one intermediator, including that the number of distinct messages sent by the sender is exactly equal to the number of actions induced in equilibrium. By example we show that, in contrast to pure strategy PBNE, the order of multiple intermediators can matter with respect to the set of possible mixed strategy PBNE outcomes.
3 See an online supplementary note for formally establishing this point.
We analytically solve for two types of mixed strategy PBNE in the broadly studied uniform-quadratic specification of the model, for one intermediator, and characterize the set of bias pairs for which these equilibria exist. We show that both of these types of equilibria exist in a full-dimensional set of parameters. As opposed to the case of pure strategies, the set of equilibria is not monotonic in the intermediator's bias: For certain specifications of the sender bias, the only PBNE with an intermediator whose bias is close enough to 0 is babbling, while there are informative equilibria with intermediators having larger biases. However, once the bias of the intermediator is too large, again only the babbling equilibrium prevails. We find PBNE involving nontrivial mixing both when the intermediator is biased in the opposite and when she is biased in the same direction as the sender. Interestingly, the latter requires the intermediator to be strictly more biased than the sender.
We conclude the paper by providing a simple sufficient condition for the existence of an intermediator that can facilitate nontrivial information transmission in cases when the only equilibrium in the direct communication game between the sender and the receiver is babbling.
Our paper is complementary to several recent papers. Li (2007) and Ivanov (2009) consider a setting similar to ours, but with only one intermediator, and focusing on the uniform-quadratic specification of the CS framework. Li only considers pure strategy equilibria and concludes that intermediation cannot improve efficiency. Even within the class of pure strategies, Li does not characterize all equilibria. Ivanov recognizes the importance of mixing by the intermediator, but asks a different set of questions than our paper. Instead of investigating the set of equilibria of an indirect communication game with exogenously given preferences for all players, Ivanov shows that when the intermediator can be freely selected by the receiver, there exists a strategic mediator and a mixed strategy PBNE of the resulting indirect communication game in which the receiver's ex ante payoff is as high as the maximum payoff attainable by any mechanism. This is a sharp welfare improvement result, but it only applies to the uniform-quadratic specification of the model. Finally, Galeotti et al. (2009) , a working paper concurrent with the first version of our paper, examines strategic communication on general networks, but in a setting where the state space and therefore communication is much simpler than in the CS model: players receive binary signals. Moreover, Galeotti et al. (2009) restricts attention to equilibria in pure strategies.
There are other recent papers investigating the effect of nonstrategic noise in communication in the CS framework.
4 Blume et al. (2007) examine com-munication in the CS model with an exogenously specified noise: with a certain probability the receiver gets not the sender's original message, but a random message. Although some of the intuition for improved communication is similar to ours, the equilibria achieving welfare improvement are very different than in our model: some sender types are required to mix among all possible messages. Goltsman et al. (2008) characterize equilibrium payoffs in the uniform-quadratic specification of the CS framework if players have access to an impartial (nonstrategic) mediator. 5 They also consider stochastic delegation, that is when the receiver can ex ante commit to a probabilistic message-contingent action plan.
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Also related to our paper is Krishna and Morgan (2004) , which shows that there exist mixed equilibria in multiple rounds of two-sided communication that can improve information transmission relative to the best equilibrium with only one round of communication.
7 In such equilibria high and low types of senders pool at some stage of the communication, while intermediate types send a separate message. This type of non-monotonicity cannot occur in equilibrium in our setting. Niehaus (2008) considers chains of communication, as in our paper, but in a setting with no conflict of interest among agents, and hence non-strategic communication. Instead, Niehaus assumes an exogenous cost of communication and examines the welfare loss arising from agents not taking into account positive externalities generated by communication.
Finally, there are multi-sender extensions of the CS framework in which communication is not intermediated, instead all senders observe some signal and then talk directly to the final decision-maker(s), either simultaneously or sequentially: see Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) , Austen-Smith (1993) , Morgan (2001a, 2001b) , Battaglini (2002) , Sørensen (2006a, 2006b) , Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) , Alonso et al. (2008) , and Eső and Fong (2009) . In these models payoff-relevant mixing cannot occur on the equilibrium path.
ences are private information, so that from the point of view of the receiver, the sender's action is a random variable even conditioning on the state, just like in the case of nosiy communication. See Olszewski (2004) , Chen et al. (2006) and Li and Madarász (2008) .
5 See Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986) for earlier papers on general communication devices.
6 See also Kováč and Mylovanov (2007) . 7 See also Aumann and Hart (2003) for cheap talk with multiple rounds of communication.
The model
Here we formally extend the model in CS to chains of communication. In particular, we impose the same assumptions for the preferences of all players as CS for all players involved in the communication chain.
We consider the following sequential-move game with n ≥ 3 players. In stage 1, player 1 (the sender) observes the realization of a random variable θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1], and sends a message m 1 ∈ M 1 to player 2 (which only player 2 observes, not the other players). From now on we will refer to θ as the state. The c.d.f. of θ is F (θ), and we assume it has a density function f that is strictly positive and absolutely continuous on [0, 1] . In stage k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1} player k sends a message m k ∈ M k to player k + 1 (which only player k + 1 observes). Note that the message choice of player k in stage k can be conditional on the message she received in the previous stage from player k − 1 (but not on the messages sent in earlier stages, since she did not observe those). We assume that M k is a Borel set that has the cardinality of the continuum, for every k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. We refer to players 2, ..., n − 1 as intermediators. In stage n of the game, player n (the receiver ) chooses an action y ∈ R. This action choice can be conditional on the message she received from player n − 1 in stage n − 1 (but none of the messages sent in earlier stages).
More formally, the strategy of player 1 is defined by a probability distribution μ 1 on the Borel-measurable subsets of [0, 1]×M 1 for which μ 1 (A×M 1 ) = R A f for all measurable sets A, the strategy of player k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1} is a probability distribution μ k on the Borel-measurable subsets of M k−1 × M k , and the strategy of player n is a probability distribution μ n on the Borelmeasurable subsets of M n−1 × R. Given the above probability distributions, there exist regular conditional distributions p 1 (·|θ) for every θ ∈ Θ, and p k (·|m k−1 ) for every k ∈ {2, ..., n} and m k−1 ∈ M k−1 .
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The payoff of player k ∈ {1, ..., n} is given by u k (θ, y), which we assume to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave in y. Note that the messages m 1 , ..., m n−1 sent during the game do not enter the payoff functions directly; hence the communication we assume is cheap talk.
We assume that for fixed θ, u n (θ, y) reaches its maximum value 0 at y n (θ) = θ, while u k (θ, y) reaches its maximum value 0 at y
We refer to y k (θ) as the ideal point of player k at state θ, and to b k (θ) as the bias of agent k at state θ. Note that we normalize the receiver's bias to be 0 in every state.
As opposed to the original CS game, intermediators in our model might 8 See Loève (1955, p137-138). need to condition their messages on a nondegenerate probability distribution over states. For this reason, it will be convenient for us to extend the definition of a player's bias from single states to probability distributions over states. Let Ω be the set of probability distributions over Θ. Let
ity distribution μ ∈ Ω, and every k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. In words, b k (μ) is the difference between the optimal actions of player k and the receiver, conditional on belief μ. Note that the term is well-defined, since our assumptions imply that both R θ∈Θ u k (θ, y) dμ and R θ∈Θ u n (θ, y) dμ are strictly concave in y.
We adopt two more assumptions of CS into our context. The first is the single-crossing condition
.., n}. This in particular implies that all players in the game would like to induce a higher action at a higher state. The second one is that either b 1 (θ) > 0 at every θ ∈ Θ or b 1 (θ) < 0 at every θ ∈ Θ, and that either
.., n − 1} and μ ∈ Ω. In words, players 1, ..., n − 1 have well-defined directions of biases (either positive or negative). The condition imposed on the sender is the same as in CS, while the condition imposed on the intermediators is stronger in that their biases with respect to any belief (as opposed to only point beliefs) are required to be of the same sign.
Finally, we assume that all parameters of the model are commonly known to the players.
We refer to the above game as the indirect communication game. Occasionally we will also refer to the direct communication game between the sender and the receiver. This differs from the above game in that there are only two stages, and two active players. In stage 1 the sender observes the realization of θ ∈ Θ and sends message m 1 ∈ M 1 to the receiver. In stage 2 the receiver chooses an action y ∈ R.
The solution concept we use is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). For the formal definition of PBNE we use in our context, see Appendix A.
Both in the context of the indirect and the direct communication game, we will refer to the probability distribution on Θ × R induced by a PBNE strategy profile as the outcome induced by the PBNE. Two PBNE are outcomeequivalent if outcomes induced by them are the same.
Pure strategy equilibria
Our first result establishes that every pure strategy PBNE in the game of indirect communication is outcome-equivalent to a PBNE of the direct com-munication game between the sender and the receiver. That is, the set of possible pure strategy equilibrium outcomes in any indirect communication game is a subset of the set of possible equilibrium outcomes in the direct communication game obtained by eliminating the intermediators. This makes characterizing pure strategy PBNE in indirect communication games fairly straightforward, since the characterization of PBNE in the direct communication game is well-known from CS. In particular, whenever the sender has a nonzero bias, there is a finite number of distinct equilibrium outcomes.
For the formal proofs of all propositions, see Appendix B.
Proposition 1: For every pure strategy PBNE of the indirect communication game, there is an outcome-equivalent PBNE of the direct communication game.
In the Appendix we actually prove the above result for a much larger class of games than communication chains. We show that in any communication game in which exactly one player (the sender) observes the state and in which exactly one player (the receiver) takes an action, no matter what the communication network and the communication protocol are, the resulting pure strategy PBNE outcomes are a subset of the PBNE outcomes in the direct communication game between the sender and the receiver. In particular, at any stage any player can simultaneously communicate to any finite number of other players, intermediators can be arranged along an arbitrary communication network instead of a line, and there can be multiple rounds of communication between the same players. The intuition behind the proof for the particular case of communication chains is that in a pure strategy PBNE, every message of the sender induces a message of the final intermediator and an action by the receiver deterministically. Hence, the sender can effectively choose which action to induce, among the ones that can be induced in equilibrium. To put it differently, the conditions for optimality of strategies for the sender and receiver in a pure strategy profile are essentially the same in any indirect communication game as in the corresponding direct communication game. In the direct communication game they comprise necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, while in an indirect communication game they are only necessary, since optimality of the intermediators' strategies should also be satisfied.
Next we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a given PBNE of the direct communication game to have an outcome-equivalent PBNE in an indirect communication game, and hence we completely characterize the set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.
Let Θ(y) be the set of states at which the induced outcome is y, for every y ∈ Y . Furthermore, for ease of exposition, we introduce the convention that whenever Θ(y) is a singleton consisting of state θ 0 , then R θ∈Θ(y) 
for every y, y 0 ∈ Y and k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}.
In words, the condition in the proposition requires that conditional on the set of states in which a given equilibrium action is induced, none of the intermediators would strictly prefer any of the other equilibrium actions. The intuition behind the result is straightforward: if conditional on states in which equilibrium action y is induced, an intermediator strictly prefers a different equilibrium action y 0 , then there has to be at least one equilibrium message after which the equilibrium strategy prescribes the intermediator inducing y even though given his conditional belief he prefers y 0 -a contradiction. The condition in Proposition 2 is convenient, since it can be checked for all intermediators one by one.
As in Proposition 1, the "if" part of Proposition 2 can be generalized to general networks and protocols, as long as there is at least one line of communication actually reaching the receiver. But we note that, as opposed to this, the "only if" part of Proposition 2 does not generalize in a straightforward manner to general communication networks and protocols. To provide some intuition, consider an example with four players in the uniform-quadratic specification of the model, with biases for players 1-3 being: b 1 = 0.1, b 2 = 0.8, and b 3 = 0.8. The direct communication game has a 2-cell partition equilibrium with cutoff point 0.3, implying equilibrium actions 0.15 and 0.65. The resulting outcome cannot be supported in the indirect communication games we consider, namely when communication happens along a line sequence. In fact, it could not be supported even if only one of the above intermediators were in the chain, as the bias of both of them are large enough so that they would prefer to induce action 0.65 instead of action 0.15 when the expectation of the state is 0.15. However, suppose now that instead of communicating only to one intermediator, player 1 can send a message, simultaneously, to both players 2 and 3. After observing these messages, both players 2 and 3 can send a message to player 4, who then takes an action. In short, the sender communicates to the intermediator through two parallel channels. In this game there is an outcome-equivalent PBNE to the two-cell partition equilibrium above. The reason is that when the receiver receives inconsistent messages from the two intermediators talking to him, his (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs can be specified in a way that hurts both of the intermediators, for example by specifying a point belief at state 0, leading to action 0. In general, if for a given equilibrium of the direct communication game it holds that for every equilibrium action there exists a point in the state space which is, conditionally on the partition cell where the equilibrium action belongs to, worse for both intermediators than the equilibrium action, then an outcome-equivalent PBNE can be constructed in the indirect communication game with the above structure.
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An immediate corollary of Proposition 2 is that the order of intermediators is irrelevant with respect to the set of pure strategy PBNE outcomes, since the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2 is independent of the sequencing of intermediators.
Another corollary of the result, stated formally below, is that the set of equilibrium outcomes is monotonically decreasing in the bias of any intermediator. For the intuition behind this, consider an intermediator with a positive bias (the negative bias case is perfectly symmetric). Conditional on the set of states inducing equilibrium action y, the set of actions that the intermediator strictly prefers to y is an open interval with the left-endpoint at y. Moreover, this interval gets strictly larger if the intermediator's bias increases, making it less likely that the condition in Proposition 2 holds for a given PBNE of the direct communication game.
In order to define increased bias formally in the general specification of the model, we need to introduce some new notation (the definition is much simpler for state-independent biases, see below). Fix two payoff functions, u and v. We say that v is more positively (resp. negatively) biased than u, if there exist affine transformations of u and v, u * and v * respectively, such that ∂v
for every θ and y. An example of v being more positively biased than u is when v is obtained by shifting u to the right, that is if there exists δ > 0 such that u(y, θ) = v(y + δ, θ) for every y and θ.
Proposition 3: Let k ∈ {2, ..., n−1} and fix the preferences of all players other than k. Let u k be a payoff function implying positive (respectively, negative) bias. If v k is more positively (resp. negatively) biased than u k , then for every pure strategy PBNE of the indirect communication game in which player k's payoff function is v k , there is an outcome-equivalent purestrategy PBNE of the indirect communication game in which player k's payoff function is u k .
The above results simplify considerably for the case where players have state-independent biases and symmetric loss functions, that is when there exist b 1 , ..., b n−1 ∈ R and l :
In this context, conditional on the set of states that induce an equilibrium action y, the set of actions player k (for k ∈ {2, ..., n−1}) strictly prefers to y is (y, y+2b k ). Therefore, the condition in Proposition 2 simplifies to |y − y 0 | ≥ 2|b k | for every two actions y 6 = y 0 induced in equilibrium, while Proposition 3 simplifies to stating that the set of outcomes that can be supported in pure strategy PBNE is monotonically decreasing in |b k |, for every k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}. Note also that if for some k * ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}, we have |b
.., n − 1}, and hence the condition in Proposition 2 holds. This means that only the intermediator with the largest absolute value bias matters in determining which pure strategy PBNE outcomes of the direct communication game can be supported as a PBNE outcome in indirect communication, as the intermediator becomes a bottleneck in the strategic transmission flow of information.
We conclude the section with a brief discussion of a limit case of our model when player 1 is unbiased (from the point of view of the receiver), since this case is not considered explicitly in CS. Propositions 1-3 above can easily modified to cover this case. In particular, the direct communication game in this case has an equilibrium with full information revelation, and for every m ∈ Z ++ at least one partition equilibrium with m partition cells (in the uniform-quadratic specification of CS, the unique such equilibrium partition is when all cells have length
Mixed strategy equilibria
In this section, we analyze mixed strategy PBNE of indirect communication games. We show that for some parameter values there can be mixed equilibria that ex ante Pareto-dominate all PBNE of the direct communication game. That is, intermediators might facilitate better information transmission. Moreover, as opposed to pure strategy PBNE, the set of mixed strategy PBNE is a complicated nonmonotonic function of the intermediators' biases.
In Subsection 4.1, we derive general properties of mixed strategy PBNE. In Subsection 4.2, we provide two classes of examples of mixed strategy PBNE in the uniform-quadratic specification of the model. In Subsection 4.3, we show that the order of intermediators matters with respect to the set of possible PBNE outcomes. Finally, in Subsection 4.4, we provide a condition for an intermediator to be able to facilitate information transmission, in cases where no information can be transmitted in a direct communication game.
General properties of mixed equilibria
Below we show that although there might be many different mixed strategy PBNE of an indirect communication game, all of them are outcomeequivalent to some equilibrium in which the following properties hold: (i) the state space is partitioned to a finite number of intervals such that in the interior of each partition cell, player 1 sends the same (pure) message; (ii) the receiver plays a pure strategy after any message, and all other players mix between at most two distinct messages after any history; (iii) the probability distribution over actions that different messages of a player i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} induce can be ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Moreover, there is a finite upper bound on the number of actions that can be induced in a PBNE of a given indirect communication game.
Before we state the above results formally, we first establish that the assumptions we imposed on the preferences of players imply that for every intermediator, there exists a positive minimal bias. That is, there exists a belief over states such that the intermediator's bias is weakly smaller given this belief than given any other belief, and this minimal bias is strictly larger than zero.
We refer to b k as the minimum absolute bias of player k. Next we show that in any PBNE, the receiver plays a pure strategy, and any distinct actions induced in equilibrium cannot be closer to each other than the minimum absolute bias of player n − 1. The first result is an immediate consequence of the strict concavity of the receiver's payoff in the action choice, implying that for any belief, there is a unique payoff-maximizing action. The intuition behind the second result is that given that the receiver always chooses the action maximizing his expected payoff conditional on the message he receives, if two equilibrium actions y and y 0 are closer to each other than the minimum absolute bias of player n − 1, then along the equilibrium path, it has to be that player n − 1 either sends a message inducing y although conditional on his beliefs y 0 would yield him a higher expected payoff, or the other way around.
Proposition 4: After any message, the receiver plays a pure strategy, and if y, y 0 ∈ R are two distinct actions that are induced in a PBNE, then the distance between them is strictly larger than b n−1 .
The result implies that 1 b n−1 serves as an upper bound on the number of distinct actions that can be induced in a PBNE. Note also that if player n−1 has a state-independent loss function and constant bias b n−1 (as assumed in most of the literature) then Proposition 4 implies that equilibrium actions have to be at least |b n−1 | away from each other, since in this case b n−1 (μ) = b n−1 for every μ ∈ Ω.
The next result shows that just like in a direct communication game a la CS, in every PBNE of an indirect communication game, the state space is partitioned to a finite number of intervals such that at all states within the interior of an interval, the sender sends essentially the same message. Moreover, the distribution of actions induced by equilibrium messages of each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. To get an intuition for this result, first note that given the strict concavity of the receiver's payoff function, given any belief, he has a unique optimal action choice. Therefore, the distributions of actions induced by equilibrium messages of player n − 1 can be trivially ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Then strict concavity of the payoff function of player n − 1 implies that in equilibrium he can mix between at most two messages, and that if he mixes between two different messages, then there cannot be a third message inducing an in-between action. This in turn implies that the distributions of actions induced by equilibrium messages of player n − 2 can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. By an iterative argument we show that this result extends to players n − 3, ..., 1. Then the single-crossing property holding for player 1's payoff function can be used to establish that the set of states from which player 1 sends a given equilibrium message form an interval.
Proposition 5: Every PBNE is outcome-equivalent to a PBNE in which Θ is partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that in the interior of any interval, player 1 sends the same message, and in which after any history any player i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} mixes at most between two messages. Moreover, the distribution of outcomes induced by different messages player i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} sends in a PBNE can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
If there is a single intermediator in the game, then some additional structure has to hold for any PBNE. In particular, the state space is partitioned into components, where play within a component is connected through mixing by the intermediator. More precisely, components are the smallest events such that, along the equilibrium path, if the state is in the interior of a given component, then it is common knowledge among players that the state is in the closure of the component. We will use this result in the next subsection to derive specific examples of mixed PBNE.
Proposition 6: If n = 3, then for every PBNE there is an outcomeequivalent PBNE, such that Θ can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals B 1 , ..., B K , referred below as components, such that for any component B k the following hold: (i) The interior of B k can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals I Proposition 6 implies that in a game with a single intermediator, the number of distinct messages (those inducing different distributions of actions) sent in equilibrium, both by the sender and by the intermediator, is equal to the number of actions induced in equilibrium.
Another special feature of an indirect communication game with a single intermediator is that if the intermediator is biased in the same direction as the sender, and his bias is more moderate than the sender's, then all PBNE are essentially in pure strategies. The only caveat is that at a finite number of states, the sender might mix between two distinct messages. Hence, by the results obtained in the previous section, such an intermediator cannot improve the efficiency of communication. This point was also made by Ivanov (2009) , in the uniform-quadratic specification of the model.
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Proposition 7: Suppose n = 3 and both the sender and the intermediator have positive (respectively, negative) bias. If the sender is more positively (respectively, negatively) biased than the intermediator, then every PBNE is outcome-equivalent to a PBNE in which players play pure actions at almost every state.
Examples of mixed equilibria
Below we investigate two types of single-component mixed PBNE with a single intermediator, in the frequently studied uniform-quadratic specification of the model: the one with two equilibrium actions, and the one with three equilibrium actions. We show that both types of mixed equilibria exist for a full-dimensional set of biases, hence the existence of nondegenerate mixed equilibria is not a knife-edge case in the indirect communication game. The examples also demonstrate that, as opposed to pure-strategy PBNE, the outcomes that can be supported in mixed-strategy PBNE are not monotonic in the magnitude of the intermediator's bias.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that n = 3. Moreover, we assume that the state is distributed uniformly on [0, 1], and the payoff functions are given by:
for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} with b 3 = 0. In words, players have fixed biases and their loss functions are quadratic.
Note that due to the quadratic payoff, player 3 must play the conditional expectation of θ given the message she receives. That is, y = E(θ|m 2 ).
2-action mixed equilibria
From Proposition 6, we know that there is an outcome-equivalent PBNE in which (i) player 1 sends message m In Appendix A we characterize the region where such equilibrium exist and analytically compute equilibrium strategies. Figure 2 illustrates the range of parameter values for which a 2-action mixed equilibrium exists, for b 1 > 0. The horizontal axis represents the sender's bias, while the vertical axis represents the intermediator's bias. 2-action mixed PBNE are unique for any given pair of biases. The upper triangular region depicts the cases when the sender and the intermediator are both positively biased and a 2-action mixed PBNE exists. Note that in all these cases the intermediator is more biased than the sender, consistent with Proposition 7. The lower four-sided region represents the cases when the intermediator's bias is of the opposite sign to the sender and a 2-action mixed PBNE exists. Recall from CS that if b 1 ∈ (0.25, 0.5), then the only PBNE in the game of direct communication is babbling, while for each such b 1 there is a range of b 2 (in the negative domain) such that there exists a 2-action mixed PBNE.
Notice that for any fixed b 1 , if b 2 is small enough in absolute value, then there is no 2-action mixed PBNE. Hence, the set of mixed PBNE outcomes, as opposed to pure strategy ones, is not monotonic in the magnitude of the intermediator's bias. Figure 2 
3-action mixed equilibria
Here, we show that within a component, mixed strategies can have a more complicated structure than in a 2-action mixed equilibria above. In particular, there is a region of parameter values for which there is a single component mixed PBNE with three actions induced in equilibrium. Like 2-action mixed PBNE, 3-action mixed PBNE are also unique for any given pair of biases. But they are much more complicated to solve for than 2-cell equilibria. The reason is that one of the equilibrium conditions requires player 1 to be indifferent at state x 1 between two nontrivial lotteries over actions. Still, we are able to characterize 3-action mixed PBNE. In Appendix A we derive a closed form solution for all the variables of interest describing a 3-action mixed equilibrium, as a function of x 1 . The value x 1 is the solution of a complicated cubic equation. The complexity of analytically solving for this type of equilibrium, together with the result below that such equilibrium does exist for a full-dimensional set of parameter values, suggests that a sharp characterization of all mixed PBNE outcomes might be infeasible. As opposed to 2-action mixed equilibria, 3-action mixed equilibria can exist when both b 1 and b 2 are close to 0. Hence, the existence of mixed PBNE with k number of actions for a given pair of biases is not monotonic in k.
The order of intermediators in mixed equilibrium
In the previous section, we showed that the order of intermediators does not matter in pure strategy PBNE. We conclude this section with an example showing that the order of intermediators does matter in mixed strategy PBNE.
Consider 4 players, i, j, k, and h, with biases b i = , and b h = 0, respectively. We consider two indirect communication games: In game A, i = 1, j = 2, k = 3, and h = 4. In game B, i = 1, j = 3, k = 2, and h = 4. Notice that in both cases i is the sender and h is the receiver. The only difference is the order of the intermediators, j and k.
In game A, it is straightforward to see that the outcome that renders action , 1] is a PBNE outcome. To see this, notice that i and j have exactly the same bias. Thus, given any belief, if i were j, he would like to induce whatever probability distribution on the state that j wants to induce for player k. Hence, i fully revealing the state to j is always compatible with PBNE, and analyzing such equilibria is equivalent to analyzing a 3-player indirect communication game, where j is the sender, k is the intermediator, and h is the receiver. In the previous subsection, we showed that in this game it is a PBNE that player j partitions the states into two components, [0, . Now we show that this outcome cannot be achieved in any PBNE of game B. Suppose the contrary, i.e. that this outcome is generated by some PBNE in game B. Since , j advises h to play 3 10 with probability one if the expectation of the state is strictly less than . If the expectation of the state is is taken with probability 1 conditional on the state lying in [0,
10
). Thus, the only possibility that j can randomize is when the state is exactly at 2 15
. But this happens with ex ante probability zero, leading to contradiction.
The result that the order of intermediators matters in mixed strategy PBNE is precisely the consequence of the nonmonotonicity of the set of PBNE in each intermediator's bias. Without the nonmonotonicity, the order cannot matter because all the intermediators have the payoff functions in the same quadratic class. But as we have seen in Figures 2 and 4 , the set of mixed PBNE is not monotonic in the intermediators' biases with quadratic payoff functions. What we have seen in the above example is that this nonmonotonicity actually causes the possibility that the order matters.
When can an intermediator facilitate information transmission?
In the previous subsections, we presented examples showing that there can be nontrivial information transmission in an indirect communication game, improving the ex ante welfare of the receiver, even if in the corresponding direct communication game, all equilibria involve babbling. A natural question to ask is when this is the case. The following result provides a simple sufficient condition for the existence of an intermediator being able to facilitate information transmission in equilibrium. We focus on the case when the sender is positively biased (the case of a negatively biased sender is perfectly symmetric). Let y
, then all PBNE of the direct communication game involve babbling, while there exists an intermediator such that in the resulting indirect communication game, there is a PBNE in which the ex ante payoff of the receiver is higher than in a babbling PBNE.
It is easy to see that the condition u 1 (a, a) < u 1 (a, y 
Discussion: Ex ante welfare
At the end of the previous section, we provided a sufficient condition for indirect communication to be able to improve the ex ante welfare of the receiver, in cases when direct communication cannot facilitate information transmission. Ivanov (2008) establishes a much stronger welfare-improvement result for the uniform-quadratic specification of the model: he shows that whenever b 1 ∈ (0, 1 2 ), that is whenever there is a mechanism that can improve the ex ante welfare of the parties, there is a strategic intermediator and a PBNE of the resulting indirect communication game which attains the same ex ante welfare as the optimal mechanism.
11 The ex ante welfare gains when using an intermediator can be quite large, as Ivanov points out.
For general preferences and prior distributions on the state, welfare comparisons between pure and mixed PBNE in indirect communication games is a hard problem. One difficulty is that unlike in the uniform-quadratic case, the interests of the sender and the receiver are not aligned anymore ex ante. Below we demonstrate this through an example of a mixed PBNE in which ex ante the sender is strictly worse off than in the babbling equilibrium, that is in the worst pure strategy PBNE.
Consider again the example in Figure 1 , with the only modification that the sender's payoff function is now u 1 (θ, y) = −(θ+ 3 10 −y) 2r , where r ∈ Z. By symmetry, the very same construction of the strategy profile as in Figure 1 constitutes a PBNE. It can be shown that, whenever r ≥ 3, the mixed PBNE gives a strictly lower payoff to the sender than in the babbling PBNE. This is because in high states, in the mixed PBNE, there is a significant chance that the induced action is very far from the ideal point of the sender, relative to the maximal distance between the sender's ideal point and the action induced in babbling equilibrium. If the sender is risk-averse enough, this makes his over all ex ante welfare worse than in the babbling equilibrium. Hence, in an indirect communication game, the sender can be worse off than in the worst PBNE of the corresponding direct communication game. By contrast, it is easy to see that the receiver can never be worse off in any PBNE than in a babbling equilibrium: one strategy that is always feasible for the receiver is choosing the babbling action independently of the messages received.
Conclusion
Our analysis of intermediated communication yields simple implications for organizational design if one restricts attention to pure-strategy equilibria: intermediators cannot facilitate transmission of information that cannot be transmitted in equilibrium in direct communication between a sender and a receiver, but they can invalidate informative equilibria of direct communication. The information loss relative to direct communication is smaller the less intermediators are involved in the chain, and the less biased they are relative to the receiver. We also show that the order of intermediators does not matter for what information can be transmitted through the chain.
At the same time, our findings reveal that the implications are much more complex with respect to mixed strategy equilibria. Different types of nontrivial mixed equilibria exist for an open set of parameter values of the model, and the existence of a given type of equilibrium is nonmonotonic in the intermediators' biases. By introducing noise in the information transmission, intermediators in a mixed strategy equilibrium can improve information transmission relative to direct communication. This can provide a rationale for establishing hierarchical communication protocols in an organization, even if such protocols are not necessitated by capacity constraints. Our investigations in the uniform-quadratic specification of the model suggest that involving an intermediator can improve information transmission if the intermediator's bias (relative to the receiver) is more moderate than the sender's, and it is in the opposite direction.
6 Appendix A 6.1 Formal definition of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
In order to define PBNE formally in our context, we need to introduce beliefs of different players at different histories. We define a collection of beliefs through a probability distribution β k on the Borel-measurable subsets of M k−1 × Ω for every k ∈ {2, ..., n}, as a collection of regular conditional distributions β k (m k−1 ) for every m k−1 ∈ M k−1 and k = {2, ..., n} that are consistent with the above probability distributions.
Definition: A strategy profile (p k ()) k=1,...,n and a collection of beliefs (β k ()) k=2,...,n constitute a PBNE if: (i) [optimality of strategies given beliefs] For every θ ∈ Θ and m 1 ∈ supp(p 1 (·|θ)), we have:
...
Z y∈R u 1 (θ, y)dp n (y|m n−1 )dp n−1 (m n−1 |m n−2 )...dp 2 (m 2 |m 0 1 ).
For every k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}, m k−1 ∈ M k−1 and m k ∈ supp(p k (·|m k−1 )), we have:
where
k (θ, y)dp n (y|m n−1 )dp n−1 (m n−1 |m n−2 )...dp
And for every m n−1 ∈ M n−1 and y ∈ supp(p n (·|m n−1 )), we have:
(ii) [consistency of beliefs with actions] β k () constitutes a conditional distribution of the probability distribution on Θ × M k−1 generated by strategies p 1 (), ..., p k−1 (), for every k ∈ {2, ..., n}. (iii) [consistency of beliefs across players] For any k ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}, if m k ∈ M k is sent along some path of play consistent with (p k ()) k=1,...,n , then
is the set of messages m k−1 in M k−1 such that there is a path of play consistent with (p k ()) k=1,...,n in which player k − 1 sends message m k−1 and player k sends message m k . Similarly, if m 1 ∈ M 1 is sent along some path of play consistent with (p
is the set of states at which player 1 sends m 1 .
We note that condition (iii) trivially follows from condition (ii) for strategy profiles in which any message sent along the path of play is sent with positive probability. Condition (iii) establishes a consistency of beliefs across players along equilibrium message chains that are sent with probability 0, for example when the message chain is induced at exactly one state.
Complete characterization of 2-action and 3-action single-component equilibria in the uniform-quadratic case
To simplify notation, we will label each message such that
With this notation we have that player 3's strategy is just y = m 2 , while the set of messages sent by player 1 correspond to the midpoints of the partition cells of the given equilibrium. We let ∆ = b 2 − b 1 .
2-action mixed equilibria
Without loss of generality, assume that b 2 < 0 (the case of b 2 > 0 is perfectly symmetric). It is convenient to do an analysis with a fixed signed b 2 , because the sign of b 2 determines after which message(s) player 2 mixes in a given type of equilibrium. Notice that the example in Figure 1 corresponds to the case of b 2 < 0. When we draw Figure 2 , we obtained the region with b 1 > 0 and b 2 > 0 by rotating the region with b 1 < 0 and b 2 < 0 in a point-symmetric manner with respect to the origin.
By Bayes' rule, m 1 only depends on x 1 : we must have m 
+ 2b
2 . Then, for player 1 to be indifferent between both messages in state x 1 we must have
So it must be that − . It is trivial to check that these conditions together with the condition 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1 are also sufficient for equilibrium. In terms of b 1 and b 2 the constraints become max{− 1 4
3-action mixed equilibria
Without loss of generality, assume that b 2 > 0 (the case of b 2 < 0 is perfectly symmetric). Notice that the example in Figure 3 corresponds to the case of b 2 < 0. Similarly to what we did in Figure 2 , when we draw Figure 4 , we obtained the region with b 1 > 0 and b 2 < 0 by rotating the region with b 1 < 0 and b 2 > 0 in a point-symmetric manner with respect to the origin. As in the case of 2-action mixed PBNE, the messages sent in equilibrium by player 1 are determined by x 1 and x 2 : m j 1 = (x j−1 + x j )/2 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3} where we let x 0 = 0 and x 3 = 1. By Bayes' rule m
Using player 2's indifferences between messages in which she mixes, we get that m
Player 1's indifference, when the state is x 2 , is equivalent to
Denote the probabilities p(m j+1 2 |m j 1 ) by p j . From Bayes' rule applied to m 3 2 , we get
And using Bayes' rule for m 2 2 we get
These equations determine the equilibrium in terms of x 1 . Now, to actually calculate x 1 , it is necessary to work with player 1's indifferences between two nontrivial lotteries.
Assuming that 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ x 2 we must have that
• p 2 ≤ 1 iff
Notice that (assuming x 2 ≥ 1/2, which follows from p 2 ≤ 1)
These equations are complicated, but we will simplify them below.
The final equation we need is player 1's indifference constraint when her type is x 1 . This reduces to
Unfortunately, the closed form Cardano solution of this equation is very complicated and not very helpful. But we may use it to simplify the condition that p 1 ≤ 1 to (3x 1 + 4∆ − 1)Σ ≥ 0,
Summing up, there is a solution iff we can find x 1 solving equation (4) with:
• 0 ≤ 2Σ ≤ x 1 from from p 1 ≤ 1 and p 1 ≥ 0.
Note that these imply 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ x 1 + 2∆ = x 2 ≤ 1. Now we have to consider two cases. Fix a pure strategy PBNE of the generalized communication game. Let S n be the set of possible message sequences that player n can receive during the game in this equilibrium. For any s ∈ S n , let Θ(s) be the set of states at which player 1 sends messages that induce message sequence s for player n. Note that Θ(s) is well-defined, since in a pure strategy profile any sequence of actions by player 1 deterministically lead to action sequences of other players.
Construct now the following strategy profile in the direct communication game: choose a distinct m 1 (s) ∈ M 1 for every s ∈ S n , and let the sender send message m 1 (s) at every θ ∈ Θ(s). Furthermore, let the action choice of the receiver after m 1 (s) be the same as her action choice after s in the PBNE of the generalized communication game, for every s ∈ S n . After any other message m 1 ∈ M 1 (which are not associated with any s ∈ S n ), assume that the receiver chooses one of the actions along the above-defined play path.
To show that this is a PBNE, first we point out that given the receiver's strategy, the sender does not have a profitable deviation at any state. This is because in the given profile, at any state, the sender can induce the same action choices as she can in the PBNE of the indirect communication game. Second, the receiver gets equilibrium message m 1 (s) in the above direct communication profile at exactly the same states as she receives message sequence s in the PBNE of the indirect communication game. Hence, after any message sent along the induced play path, the action prescribed for the receiver is sequentially rational, given the updated belief of the receiver regarding the state after receiving m 1 (s). Finally, conditional on any off-path messages by the sender, the receiver can have arbitrary beliefs in PBNE, so her choice from the actions that are used on the path of the play can be sequentially rational. ¥ Proof of Proposition 2: ("If" part) Supposing that (1) holds, we construct a PBNE of an indirect communication game that is outcome-equivalent to the original equilibrium in the direct communication game: For each y and k, choose exactly one message from M k , m k (y), so that m k (y) 6 = m k (y 0 ) if y 6 = y 0 , where y, y 0 ∈ Y . Let player 1 send message m 1 (y) conditional on Θ(y) and let player k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} send message m k (y) conditional on player k − 1's message m k−1 (y). In the off-path event that player k − 1 sends a message not in S y∈Y {m k−1 (y)}, let player k send an arbitrary message in S y∈Y {m k (y)}. Finally, let player n take an action y conditional on player n − 1's message m n−1 (y). Again, in the off-path event that player n − 1 sends a message not in S y∈Y {m n−1 (y)}, let player n take an arbitrary action in Y .
Note that players 1 and n do not have an incentive to deviate because the constructed strategy profile specifies the same correspondence of messages/actions to states as in the original PBNE of the direct communication game. Moreover, condition (1) implies that players k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} do not have an incentive to deviate, given the beliefs induced by the strategy profile described above. This concludes that the strategy profile constructed above constitutes a PBNE.
("Only if" part) Let M k−1 (y) be the set of messages of player k − 1 along the equilibrium path that induce player k to send a message from M k that eventually induces y. Let Θ(m k−1 ) be the set of states at which message m k−1 is sent by player k − 1, for every m k−1 ∈ M k−1 (y). By optimality of strategies given beliefs in PBNE (see Appendix A for the formal definition of PBNE),
By consistency of beliefs with actions in PBNE, β k () constitutes a conditional distribution of the probability distribution on Θ × M k−1 generated by the PBNE strategies, which together with (5) implies Z
Proof of Proposition 3: We will provide a proof for the case of positive biases. The case of negative biases is perfectly symmetric.
Let G u and G v stand for the games where the payoff function of player k is u k and v k , respectively. Let s * constitute a PBNE G v . Then Proposition 1 implies that Θ(y) is an interval (possibly degenerate) for every y ∈ Y , where Y is the set of actions induced by s * . Proposition 2 implies that there is an outcome-equivalent PBNE to s
for every y, y 0 ∈ Y (recall our convention for the above inequality if Θ(y) is a singleton). Also by Proposition 2, since s * constitutes a PBNE G v , we have:
for every y, y 0 ∈ Y. Fix now y, y 0 ∈ Y. Since u k implies positive bias, (6) holds trivially if y 0 < y. Suppose now that y 0 > y. Since v k is more positively biased than u k , condition (2), together with f (θ) > 0 for every θ ∈ Θ, implies there exists affine transformations of v k and u k , v k * and u k * respectively, such that: (7) implies (6). ¥ Proof of Claim 1: Without loss of generality, assume that player k has a positive bias (the negative bias case is perfectly symmetric). Then by assumption b
Since u k and u n are continuous in y and θ and, R θ∈Θ u k (θ, y)dμ and R θ∈Θ u n (θ, y)dμ are continuous in y and in μ (the latter with respect to the weak topology), arg max
Proof of Proposition 4:
In PBNE, after any message m n−1 ∈ M n−1 , the receiver plays a best response to belief β n (m n−1 ). Since the receiver's payoff is strictly concave in y and takes its maximum in [0, 1] for every θ ∈ Θ, the expected payoff is strictly concave in y and takes its maximum in [0, 1] for any belief. Hence, there is a unique best response action in [0, 1] for the receiver for β n (m n−1 ). Fix now a PBNE, let m n−1 ∈ M n−1 be a message sent in equilibrium, and let y(m n−1 ) be the action chosen by the receiver after receiving message m n−1 . Without loss of generality, assume that player n − 1 has a positive bias (the negative bias case is perfectly symmetric). Note that by our definition of PBNE, β n (m n−1 ) is a convex combination of beliefs β n−1 (m n−2 ) for which m n−1 ∈ supp(p n−1 (m n−2 )). It cannot be that for every such belief
since this would imply that arg max
tradicting that y(m n−1 ) is an optimal choice for player n after receiving m n−1 . Therefore, there is m n−2 ∈ M n−2 such that arg max
Thus, given belief β n−1 (m n−2 ), player n − 1 strictly prefers inducing any action from (y(m n−1 ), y(m n−1 ) + b n−1 ] to inducing y(m n−1 ). Therefore, there cannot be any message m 0 n−1 ∈ M n−1 that induces an action from (y(m n−1 ), y(m n−1 )+ b n−1 ], since this would contradict the optimality of m n−1 given m n−2 . This implies that the distance between any two equilibrium actions has to be strictly greater than b n−1 . ¥ Proof of Proposition 5: Fix a PBNE, and consider an outcomeequivalent PBNE in which if two messages m i , m 0 i ∈ M i used in equilibrium induce the same probability distribution over actions, then m i = m 0 i , for every i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}.
For ease of exposition, if the probability distribution over actions induced by m i ∈ M i first-order stochastically dominates that of m 0 i ∈ M i for i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, then we will simply say that m i is higher than m 0 i . Proposition 4 implies that every m n−1 induces a pure action by the receiver. Since different equilibrium messages induce different actions, it trivially holds that the distribution of outcomes that different messages that player n − 1 sends in PBNE can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Moreover, since u n−1 (θ, y) is strictly concave in y for every θ ∈ Θ, there can be at most two optimal messages for player n − 1, and in this case they have to induce actions such that there is no other equilibrium action in between them (otherwise inducing the latter action would be strictly better than inducing the originally considered actions). This establishes that the distribution of actions induced by the equilibrium messages of player n − 2 can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance: they can be either degenerate distributions corresponding to one of the finite number of actions induced in equilibrium (which in turn corresponds to one of the equilibrium messages of player n − 1), or mixtures between two neighboring equilibrium actions (which correspond to mixtures between two equilibrium messages of player n−1). Hence, we can partition the equilibrium messages of player n − 2 into a finite number of sets S n−2 1 , ..., S n−2 k n−2 such that each set consists of messages inducing a distribution of actions with the same support, and the distribution of actions induced by messages in a set with a higher index first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of actions induced by messages in a set with a lower index. Moreover, the distribution of outcomes induced by messages within set S n−2 j , for any j ∈ {1, ..., k n−2 }, can be ranked with respect to first-order stochastic dominance, too.
We will now make an inductive argument. Suppose that for some l ∈ {2, ..., n − 2}, it holds that the equilibrium messages of every player l 0 ∈ {l, ..., n − 2} can be partitioned into a finite number of sets S l 0 1 , ..., S l 0 k l 0 such that each set consists of messages inducing a distribution of actions with the same support, the distribution of actions induced by messages in a set with a higher index first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of actions induced by messages in a set with a lower index, and the distributions of outcomes induced by messages in each set can be ordered with respect ton − 1. Furthermore, we showed that player 1 can only mix between different messages at states θ 0 ,θ 1 , ..., θ t+1 . Moreover it is clear that if for j ∈ {1, ..., t} it holds that player 1 mixes between distinct messages at θ j then the messages have to be m 1 j−1 and m 1 j . Similarly, if at θ 0 = 0 (respectively, at θ t+1 = 1) player 1 mixes between distinct messages then it has to be between m 1 1 (respectively, m 1 t ) and a message associated with θ = 0 (respectively, θ = 1). This concludes that player 1 mixes between at most two distinct messages at any state. Consider now any player l ∈ {2, ..., n − 2}. Above we established that the distribution of states conditional on equilibrium messages of player l − 1 can be ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. This implies that the support of messages of player l + 1 induced by two different equilibrium messages of player l cannot be the same. But in that case strict quasi-concavity of player l's utility function implies that player l cannot have more than two optimal messages to send, at any history. ¥ Proof of Proposition 6: Given a PBNE, construct an outcome-equivalent PBNE as we did in the proof of Proposition 5. This allows us to have a partition of Θ, P = (P 1 , . . . , P J ). Parts (i) and (iv) are immediate from the proof of Proposition 5 and from Proposition 4, respectively. For now, set m 1 = j if θ ∈ P j , and m 2 = y if p 3 (y|m 2 ) > 0 (so y is given probability 1), without loss of generality.
Let partition B be such that each cell B k is minimal with the property that, if P j ⊆ B k and p 2 (y|j) > 0 where y is a PBNE action taken by player 3, then P j 0 ⊆ B k for all j 0 with p 2 (y|j 0 ) > 0. Fixing k, consider B k and the partition of B k , I k = (I k 1 , . . . , I k j k ), whose cells are also the cells of the original partition, P = (P 1 , . . . , P J ). Now we prove part (iii). The proof for (ii) is perfectly symmetric, so we provide a proof only for part (iii). Let player 1 send a message m j 1 conditional on the state lying in I k j (for natational simplicity, in this proof, we suppress the superscripts k on messages). Also, let y 1 , . . . , y j k (, y j k +1 ) be the PBNE actions induced by states in B k (We already know that there are j k (or j k +1) actions induced), with y j < y j 0 if j < j 0 . Set m j 2 = y j . Now suppose the contrary, i.e. that after message m 
Next, note that player 3 is maximizing his payoff at m Proof of Proposition 8: First, note that, by definition, y 1 0 is the optimal choice of player 3 in the babbling PBNE. Next, note that the only pure strategy PBNE is babbling. To see this, suppose that there are exactly two actions induced in a pure PBNE. Then there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that these two actions are y − E(θ|m 0 1 ). Hence, below we only need to check whether the strategies of the sender and the receiver are compatible with PBNE.
We show that there exists¯ such that if <¯ , there exists p ∈ (0, 1) and y * such that this is indeed a PBNE. To see this, we need to establish the followings: If <¯ , (i) u 1 ( , y * ) = u 1 ( , y 1 ), (ii) y 0 < y * < y 1 0 , and (iii) y * is a best response conditional on players 1 and 2's strategies. (i) ensures that player 1 takes a best response to the opponents' strategies. (ii) ensures that p ∈ (0, 1). Player 3 takes a best response to the opponents' strategies conditional on m 0 2 , by definition of y 1 . Since given any on-path messages players put probability 0 on off-path events, and conditional on any off-path messages, players can have arbitrary beliefs that make their choices optimal, (i), (ii), and (iii) are sufficient to establish that the strategy profile constitutes a PBNE.
Note that if we have u 1 ( , y 0 ) < u 1 ( , y 1 ) < u 1 ( , y 1 0 ), then we have (i) and (ii), ignoring (iii). To see this, notice that this inequality ensures that there exists y 0 ∈ (y 0 , y 1 ) such that u 1 ( , y 0 ) = u 1 ( , y 1 ). To see that y 0 6 ∈ [y . By continuity, there exists 00 such that for all < 00 , u 1 ( , y 0 ) < u 1 ( , y 1 ). Also, we have shown that for all < 0 , ∂u 1 ( ,y 1 0 ) ∂y < 0. Thus we have u 1 ( , y 1 ) < u 1 ( , y 1 0 ) if < 0 . Finally we prove (iii). Fix < min{ 0 , 00 } :=¯ . Then y * is uniquely determined by condition (i). We prove that there exists p such that player 3 takes a best response at y * . Letỹ(p) be the best response when the mixing probability is p. Notice thatỹ(p) is continuous in p. Because of strict concavity, the best response is uniquely determined conditional on any probability distribution on the state, henceỹ is a function. Note thatỹ(0) = y 0 and y(1) = y 1 0 . This implies that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such thatỹ(p) = y * , since we know that y 0 < y * < y 1 0 . Thus we have proved (iii). Overall, we have found that there exists¯ such that if <¯ , there exists p ∈ (0, 1) and y * such that this is indeed a PBNE. Notice that player 3 has an option to play y 1 0 , conditioning on any messages. Since strict concavity implies the uniqueness of the best response conditional on any probability distribution on the state, this implies that, given the conditions in this proposition, the PBNE we constructed gives a strictly higher ex ante payoff to player 3 than in any pure strategy PBNE. This completes the proof. ¥
